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Abstract
This paper assesses the eﬀects of labor mobility constraints on
racial discrimination. Our equilibrium search model shows that these
eﬀects follow an inverted U-shaped relationship. In particular, when
mobility constraints are low, we find that discrimination disappears.
We test this prediction with an exogenous mobility shock on the Euro-
pean soccer labor market. The Bosman ruling by the European Court
of Justice in 1995 lifted restrictions on soccer player mobility. Using
a panel of all clubs in the English first division from 1981 to 2008,
we compare the pre- and post-Bosman ruling market. Consistent with
a taste-based explanation, we find evidence that wage discrimination
disappears when constraints on worker mobility are lowered. (JEL
J15, J31, J6, J71)
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1 Introduction
Race diﬀerentials in labor market outcomes continue to persist and evidence
suggests that these diﬀerences are partly the consequence of racial discrim-
ination.1 “Why do people discriminate against one another, and how can
we get them to stop?” (Gneezy and List, 2013, 5). Job-to-job mobility is a
promising route to answer these questions. Constraints on mobility, such as
quotas, work permits, or restrictive contracting rules on national labor, may
limit the ability of workers to move from prejudiced firms to unprejudiced
ones. When mobility is constrained, a firm is able to act on its prejudice
because of the low cost of doing so.
In this paper, we assess the eﬀects of job-to-job mobility constraints on
racial discrimination. Our equilibrium search model reveals that these ef-
fects follow an inverted U-shaped relationship. In particular, when mobility
constraints are low, we find that discrimination disappears. We test this
prediction with an exogenous mobility shock on the European soccer labor
market. The Bosman ruling by the European Court of Justice in 1995 lifted
restrictions on soccer player mobility. Using a panel of all clubs in the En-
glish first division from 1981 to 2008, we compare the pre- and post-Bosman
ruling market. Consistent with a taste-based explanation à la Becker (1957),
we find evidence that wage discrimination disappears when constraints on
worker mobility are lowered.
The European soccer market oﬀers four important advantages for the
study of mobility and discrimination. First, following the Bosman ruling,
we observe large variation in labor mobility, making this market a valuable
and visible laboratory to study the eﬀect on discrimination. Specifically, the
pre-Bosman era had two important restrictions on job-to-job mobility: (1)
transfer fees needed to be paid for out-of-contract players and (2) the number
of foreigners was restricted by a quota system.2 The ruling, which came into
eﬀect in December 1995, removed the quota barriers for European Union
1See Altonji and Blank (1999), Lang and Lehmann (2012) and Charles and Guryan
(2011) for reviews of the literature.
2In Europe, the number of foreigners allowed to play was governed by a “3+2” rule: 3
foreign European players and 2 non-European players.
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(EU) nationals and the obligation to pay a fee for out-of-contract players.3
Figure (1) illustrates the intensified mobility of the soccer market in the wake
of the Bosman ruling. Before 1995, the quota of foreign players in England,
represented by the dashed grey line, was binding but not fulfilled. In 2008,
the ratio of foreigners in squads exceeded 50% in the English first league.
Players can now field oﬀers from potentially any country in the EU. This
policy change creates a compelling quasi-experimental variation to identify
the causal eﬀect of mobility constraints on racial discrimination.
Second, extensive data on the career paths of professional soccer players
can be gathered for most countries over long time periods.4 Third, we can
match this extensive individual data with information on the skin-color of
players.
Figure 1: Share of foreigners in club squads over time (1981-2008)
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Fourth, the soccer market oﬀers a simple test for racial discrimination in
salary setting (Szymanski, 2000). Assessing whether a group of workers is
facing wage discrimination is typically diﬃcult because we may not be able to
3Specifically, in June 1990, at the end of his contract, the former Belgian player Jean-
Marc Bosman wanted to move from Liege in Belgium to Dunkirk in France. Because
Dunkirk refused to meet the transfer fee demand, Liege refused to let him go. Bosman
decided to take his case to the courts and won. As a result, the European Commission
applied European law on worker mobility to the soccer labor market.
4Kleven, Landais, and Saez (2013) compiled data of all first-league soccer players for
14 Western European countries since the eighties.
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capture productivity exactly.5 With this caveat in mind, Szymanski’s ‘mar-
ket test’ is particularly elegant and parsimonious. Under the assumption
that soccer is an eﬃcient market,6 a team’s wage bill should perfectly reward
the talent of its players and explain the club’s performance. Discrimination
can then be said to exist if clubs fielding an above-average proportion of
black players systematically outperform clubs with a below-average propor-
tion of black players. This implies that, for a given wage bill, a team can
improve its performance by employing a higher share of black players and in
fine that black players are being paid less than their talent would warrant.
Szymanski finds evidence of discrimination while performing his test on a
panel dataset of professional English clubs between 1978 and 1993, i.e., be-
fore the Bosman ruling. We extend the analysis one step further. First, we
theoretically demonstrate why discrimination can survive in equilibrium with
labor mobility constraints. Second, we exploit the Bosman ruling shock and
provide empirical evidence that discrimination disappears with low mobility
constraints. We briefly present these two contributions.
The first contribution consists of establishing a simple theoretical model
to guide our empirical analysis. To derive equilibria in which group diﬀer-
entials persist, we merge ideas from search models of the labor market, à
la Burdett and Mortensen (1998), with a Becker-style assumption of taste
for discrimination.7 Firms are heterogeneous in the talent of the workers
whom they employ. For a given talent, firms oﬀer workers two types of
contracts: perfect and imperfect. A job oﬀer is considered to be “perfect”
when the worker receives a wage that perfectly rewards his talent, and “im-
perfect” when the worker earns only a fraction of what his talent is worth.
The worker accepts the imperfect job oﬀer if the wage oﬀered exceeds his
5Using a Mincer-type wage equation, for instance, with a dummy indicating whether
a person belongs to a particular group is plagued by a common estimation problem: how
do we account for unobserved variables? (See Charles and Guryan, 2011).
6Unlike the professional sport labor markets in the US, there are no collective bargaining
agreements, salary caps, or draft picks to maintain a competitive balance between teams.
7Altonji and Blank (1999) reviews the pioneering works introducing search into taste-
based theories of discrimination. Note that statistical discrimination, based on stereotypes
and made possible by imperfect information, is not an issue in our setting since employers
easily observe the performance of soccer players. There is thus little uncertainty over a
player’s productivity.
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reservation wage and searches on the job.8 Hence, the firm faces a job oﬀer
trade-oﬀ between diverting a share of the player’s talent and seeing the player
potentially poached by a rival, which induces a costly turnover.9
We assume that the taste parameter for discrimination aﬀects the job
oﬀer trade-oﬀ. A prejudiced firm has lower disutility when it terminates an
employment relationship with disliked workers, and thus, its probability of
oﬀering these workers a perfect job oﬀer is lower. This results in race-based
wage diﬀerentials. We find, however, that this discriminatory behavior does
not survive in all circumstances. The prejudice does not translate into dis-
crimination when labor mobility constraints are suﬃciently low or suﬃciently
high. The intuition is straightforward. For a given talent, when mobility
constraints are suﬃciently high, firms have high monopsony power and oﬀer
imperfect contracts to all workers, independent of their race.10 By contrast,
when mobility constraints are suﬃciently low, monopsony power is reduced,
and firms oﬀer perfect contracts to all workers to avoid costly turnovers. In
between these extreme cases, the relationship between worker mobility con-
straints and racial wage diﬀerentials follows an inverted U-shaped form as a
consequence of diﬀerent turnover rates between worker-types.
Our model is close to Bowlus and Eckstein (2002), where firms are en-
gaged in search.11 In their model, disliked workers are (potentially) less
talented on average and are sought less intensively by prejudiced firms; thus,
these workers receive fewer oﬀers and lower wages and have higher unemploy-
ment rates. We complement their analysis by considering that prejudiced
firms do not search less intensively for disliked workers, who have the same
distribution of talents as preferred workers. The prejudice applies to the sep-
8In Holden and Rosén (2009), firms also oﬀer two types of contracts, high versus low,
depending on a random parameter governing productivity of the job-worker match. In our
setting, the probability of oﬀering a perfect or imperfect contract is endogenized.
9The same mechanism can be found in Stiglitz (1974), where firms in urban areas
increase wages to reduce costly turnovers.
10Note that this statement does not imply that all wages are equal, as workers are
heterogeneous in talent, and wages are proportional to talent.
11Black (1995) also introduces taste-based discrimination in a search model. Our model,
however, deviates from Black’s in three important ways. First, workers rather than firms
are engaging in search. Second, prejudiced firms cannot refuse to hire disliked workers at
any positive wage, and third, workers are also allowed to search on the job.
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aration rate. Prejudiced firms have a lower disutility in parting with disliked
workers. Our results are consistent with Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) and
race-based wage diﬀerentials. However, as in simpler models, such as Becker
(1957), we predict that discrimination is eliminated through intensified labor
mobility, i.e., increased competition to attract talent.
The second contribution consists of using the Bosman ruling on the En-
glish soccer market to estimate the causal eﬀect of intensified labor mobility
on discrimination. Remember that (1) players whose contracts have expired
can now change clubs freely and (2) EU players can now move within the
EU without taking up a valuable space in a foreign team’s quota. These two
eﬀects make it easier to “poach” employees and influence firms’ monopsony
power. Interpreting the Bosman ruling as a shock on job-to-job mobility
constraints, we find empirical evidence that wage discrimination disappeared
in the post-Bosman period.12
The diﬀerence between the pre- and post-Bosman eras is robust to the use
of various (1) estimators (OLS, within, IV and GMM), (2) samples (either
league or match performance), and (3) groups of players (either black or
white and either English or non-English). In particular, we find that black
non-EU players still face some wage discrimination in the post-Bosman era
due to higher mobility constraints relative to EU players. Moreover, the
decrease in discrimination appears to be extremely fast: we find evidence of
discrimination in the 5 years before the ruling, but no eﬀect in the following
5 years.
Our results could be important for public policy. If we consider restrictive
contracts to be an important component of the typically nebulous “labor
12In a fascinating book documenting how soccer can help economics, Palacios-Huerta
(2014) reviews Szymanski’s paper. Concomitant to our work, Palacios-Huerta extends
Szymanski’s sample from 1993 to 2008 and confirms the absence of discrimination in this
period. His intuition is that the emergence of a market for corporate control of English
professional clubs since the early 1980s has increased the competitiveness of English soc-
cer. The added competition would have been able to drive discriminating firms out of
the market. This eﬀect may complement our mobility mechanism. A potential issue is,
however, that a club experiencing very poor performance simply moves down from one
division to another and is thus not driven out of the soccer market. Moreover, some firms
operate under a soft budget constraint (Andreﬀ, 2014). Our hypothesis is that the labor
market became more competitive primarily because of relaxed constraints on mobility.
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market frictions”, facilitating job changes and reducing frictions could lower
discrimination.
A potential objection to our findings is that what we are measuring may
not truly be the eﬀect of the Bosman ruling but instead a change in atti-
tudes toward racism and racial discrimination. Lang and Lehmann (2012)
document a smooth decline in prejudiced views on school segregation, social
interaction, and blacks in politics, as measured by national polls and surveys
in the United States. The data reject, however, the idea of a dramatic reduc-
tion in discrimination over our period of analysis. Sport is not immune to
racial bias, which exists on basketball courts (Price and Wolfers, 2010) and
soccer fields. Since the Bosman ruling, racist incidents in soccer, whether
from fellow soccer players, owners, managers or supporters continue to make
the headlines of English newspapers:13 in 2011, the English captain John
Terry was accused of racial abuse, and in 2012, Marvin Sordell was racially
abused by a Millwall fan. In August 2014, it came to light that the Cardiﬀ
City manager Malky Mackay shared racist e-mails and texts with the direc-
tor of soccer in charge of transfers, Iain Moody.14 Frequent incidents suggest
first that racist attitudes are still present at all levels of English soccer, and,
second, that the decrease in discrimination is more likely to be caused by a
decrease in job-to-job mobility constraints, in the wake of the Bosman ruling,
rather than a dramatic change in attitudes of prejudiced employers in 1995.
Our result regarding intensified mobility is consistent with Becker’s ar-
gument that intensified product market competition can reduce race-based
diﬀerentials caused by prejudice. Using regulatory reforms in U.S banking,
Levine, Levkov, and Rubinstein (2008) show that the exogenous intensifica-
tion of competition among non-financial firms has reduced the manifestation
of racial prejudices in the demand for labor and has raised the wages for
13In the web appendix, we show strong evidence on racism in the English soccer in the
post-Bosman era.
14For instance, the Daily Mail report that “On August 16, 2012, a list of players proposed
by a French agent is forwarded, stating to Mackay that “he needs to rename his agency
the All Blacks.” A separate text in reference to a list of French players states that “Not
many white faces amongst that lot but worth considering.” In November 2014, the owner
of Wigan Athletic FC, Dave Whelan stated while defending his decision to hire Malky
Mackay that, “I think Jewish people do chase money more than everybody else.”
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black workers to approach those of equally productive white workers.
Our paper is also related to more recent works examining the influence
of labor market tightness on discrimination (Biddle and Hamermesh, 2013,
Baert et al, 2014). These studies emphasize that employers discriminate less
in labor markets with a small number of job seekers relative to vacancies. By
oﬀering more job opportunities, our mobility shock can be interpreted as a
decrease in the ratio of employed job seekers to job oﬀers, as there will be
more competition between firms to attract workers. This situation should
discourage employers from indulging in discriminatory tendencies.15
The rest of the paper is as follows. In section (2), we describe the context
of our analysis and the competitive soccer market. In section (3), we set out
a theoretical model to guide our empirical analysis and to explain how la-
bor mobility constraints aﬀect discrimination. In section (4), we present the
identification strategy and the specifications of the market test for discrimi-
nation. Our empirical results on discrimination in the English soccer league
are presented in section (5). The most important result is that discrimination
disappears after the Bosman Ruling. Section (6) concludes.
2 The competitive market for soccer players
We have already discussed the four important advantages oﬀered by the
soccer market to the study of mobility and discrimination: (1) large observed
variation in labor mobility constraints following the Bosman ruling; (2) an
extensive collection of data on the career paths of professional soccer players,
(3) data on the skin-color of individuals that we can match with our dataset,
and (4) a simple test for racial discrimination in salary setting (Szymanski,
2000). Using a panel of all clubs in the English first division from 1981 to
2008, we now present three important features related to the competitiveness
of the soccer market.
15The Bosman ruling shock may have also increased competition among workers by
oﬀering firms a larger pool of job seekers. However, to the extent that firms pay a turnover
cost when workers quit, their monopsony power is reduced by the increased mobility of
the labor market.
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Our dataset is similar to Szymanski (2000) but diﬀers in scope and time.16
In terms of scope, Szymanski uses a panel of 39 clubs from four divisions in
the English soccer league over the 1978-1993 period. Thanks to Kleven et
al. 2013, our dataset contains all professional soccer players, regardless of
nationality, from the first league in England.17 In terms of time, we ex-
tend Szymanski’s sample to cover the post-Bosman era, from 1994 to 2008.
Despite diﬀerences in scope and time, the most salient features remain.
First, league competition is hierarchical, focused on league rankings with-
out play-oﬀs. Each year, approximately 20 teams participate in the English
first league. At the end of each season the worst-performing teams swap
places with the highest-ranked teams in the second league. There are no
collective bargaining agreements, salary caps, or draft picks to maintain a
competitive balance between teams.
Second, clubs are heterogeneous in wage bills, as shown in Figure (2). This
figure reports the log of the clubs’ wage bills in the English first league from
1981 to 2008. It is worth mentioning that wage bills are linearly increasing
over the years for all clubs, without being aﬀected by the Bosman ruling.
Figure 2: Club’s Wage Bills
Elasticity = .17 (p<0.01)
R-squared = .91
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16See Appendix (A) for further information on variable definitions and data sources.
17We only have access to information on professional players from the top league, but
our number of clubs is fairly similar to that in Szymanski’s sample: 41 teams from 1981
to 1993.
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Third, soccer is a competitive market for talent. A common explanation
for the increasing trend depicted in Figure (2) is the increasing price of talent.
Players earn wages proportional to their talent. Thus, the higher the club’s
sporting talent, the higher the wage bill,18 and the higher the ranking. Using
clubs’ wage bill data and computing an index of performance based on league
rankings (see 4.4 for detailed computation), we confirm that the English
soccer market is fairly competitive. Wage expenditures and performance
are heavily correlated in the English league between 1981 and 2008. This
correlation is depicted in Figure (3) and holds despite the surge in player
remuneration (see Figure 2).
Figure 3: Average Wage Bill and Performance
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3 Theoretical framework
We establish an equilibrium labor market search model in the style of Burdett
and Mortensen (1998), in which firms are homogeneous in size because the
number of players per team is fairly rigid. Firms are instead heterogeneous in
their wage bills (see section 2). We assume that a club’s budget is given and is
spent searching for talent and paying wages. In this search setting, we intro-
duce racial discrimination. We assume that some employers hold a ‘taste’ for
18In Appendix (B), we construct a crude a measure of the sporting quality of the team,
as a proxy for its sporting talent. Figure (8) depicts a clear linear correlation between
wage bill and team’s quality, with an r-squared of 0.81.
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racial discrimination. If this assumption holds, then disliked workers should
‘compensate’ prejudiced employers by being more productive at a given wage
or, equivalently, by accepting a lower wage for an identical level of produc-
tivity. Becker (1957) argues, however, that prejudice against disliked workers
does not necessarily result in economic discrimination and race-based wage
diﬀerentials. In other words, an employer’s taste for discrimination does not
mean economic discrimination at the margin. Without some market failure,
these wage diﬀerentials should be eliminated with competition. Using a job
search model, we study the role of constraints on job-to-job mobility as a
market failure. Specifically, we show that limited mobility, as was the case
before the Bosman ruling, may explain race-based wage diﬀerentials. This
result is formalized below.
We first present worker behavior (3.1), the flow conditions (3.2) and firm
behavior (3.3) before introducing the role of taste discrimination (3.4). We
solve the model analytically and present some simulations as an illustration
of our results on wage discrimination (3.5) and job turnover (3.6).
3.1 Workers
The mass L of workers is divided into two types according to their appear-
ance, A and B. Type B could be discriminated against by employers. All
workers are heterogeneous in talent independent of their type, and each type
has the same distribution of talent. The decision problem faced by a worker
in a traditional job search model is simple (see e.g. Burdett and Mortensen,
1998); he maximizes utility over an infinite horizon in continuous time by
adopting a reservation wage strategy that is state dependent. At any mo-
ment in time, each worker is either unemployed (state 0) or employed (state
1). Firms are engaged in search, and, at random time intervals, workers
receive information about new or alternative jobs. This information is en-
capsulated in the parameter of the Poisson arrival process,  , which denotes
the arrival rate of job oﬀers. This parameter reflects the general state of the
labor market, including contracting rules, institutional constraints on and
barriers to mobility. This market parameter also depends on the worker’s
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current situation (employed or not). Job-worker matches are destroyed at an
exogenous positive rate,  .
Workers are assumed to be risk neutral, with the discount rate r. Workers
must respond to oﬀers as soon as they arrive. The wage (!) that they
receive is function of their talent, t, such that ! = kt, where 0 < k  1.
Workers accept the job oﬀer if it pays a higher wage while employed or if
the instantaneous utility of being unemployed is lower than that of being
employed.
In this wage posting framework, firms have monopsony power.19 When a
firm does not exercise its monopsony power, k = 1, and the worker receives
a wage that perfectly rewards his talent, t, such that ! = t. Because this
perfect job oﬀer is the best oﬀer that the worker can receive with talent t,
the worker remains with the employer. By contrast, when a firm exercises
its monopsony power, k < 1, and the worker receives an “imperfect” or bad
job oﬀer. This implies that the worker receives a wage that is equal to only a
fraction of his talent. Because his talent is imperfectly rewarded and because
soccer is a market for talent (see section 2), the worker searches on the job.
However, the probability of receiving a perfect job oﬀer,  , depends on the
state of the labor market and on firm behavior (described below).
Given this framework, the expected discounted utility of a job-seeker
when unemployed, U , can be expressed as follows:
rU = b+  0( WP + (1   )WI   U), (1)
where WP and WI are the discounted values of filling a perfect and an
imperfect oﬀer, respectively. Equation (1) is rather standard (e.g., see Pis-
sarides, 1990). Being unemployed is similar to holding an asset. This asset
pays a dividend of b, the unemployment benefit, and it has a probability
 0(1    ) of being transformed into a bad match, in which case the worker
obtains WI and loses U . It also has a probability  0  of being transformed
into a good match, yielding a capital gain of WP .
For the sake of simplicity, we derive the discounted present value of em-
19Evidence of monopsony power in sport is documented in Kahn (2000).
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ployment in an imperfect match, WI , for a given value of k rather than a
continuous distribution as follows:
rWI = kt+  1 (WP  WI) +  (U  WI), (2)
and for a perfect match as
rWP = t+  (U  WP ). (3)
Equations (2) and (3) have an intuition similar to that of equation (1).
If a job seeker finds a perfect job, then he accepts the oﬀer and remains in
the job until an exogenous separation process moves him to unemployment
(equation 3). A bad or imperfect job oﬀer is rejected by an employed worker
and accepted by an unemployed one. A worker with an imperfect contract
remains in the job until either quitting to obtain a better job or an exogenous
separation (equation 2).
Observe also that those equations are written under the assumption that
U is always smaller than WI (and WP ). Because this condition holds, there
is no “waiting” behavior in this model, as an individual who receives a bad
oﬀer cannot hold out to receive a good oﬀer. His reservation wage is such
that it is always beneficial to accept an imperfect match.20
3.2 Flow conditions
As jobs are identical apart from the wage associated with their talent, em-
ployed workers move from lower- to higher- paying jobs as the opportunities
arise. Workers also move from employment to unemployment and vice versa.
We use standard equilibrium conditions (e.g., Mortensen 1988) to solve for
the steady-state equilibrium labor supply. In the steady state, all flows must
be balanced for there to be a stable equilibrium. Thus, we find three equilib-
rium conditions to determine the equilibrium shares of unemployed (u) and
employed workers in perfect (P ) or imperfect (I) jobs. Flows in and out of
unemployment have to balance (i), as well as flows in and out from imperfect
20Given the high wages of soccer players, this assumption does not seem to be outlandish.
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(ii) and perfect (iii) jobs:
i. Unemployment flows have to balance:
 0u =  (1  u)) u =  
 0 +  
. (4)
ii. Number of flows out of imperfect matches are equal to number of flows
into imperfect matches
I(  +  1 ) =  0(1   )u) I =  0(1   ) 
(  +  1 )(  +  0)
. (5)
iii. Number of flows out of perfect matches are equal to number of flows
into perfect matches
 P =  1 I +  0 u) P =  1  0(1   )
(  +  1 )(  +  0)
+
 0 
( 0 +  )
. (6)
3.3 Firms
Firms maximize team performance, which is measured by the percentage of
wins, championship success, or, as is usually the case in league soccer, league
position (Szymanski, 2000). Team performance depends on the quantity of
sporting talent hired by the club. Remember that firms are homogeneous in
size but heterogeneous in wage bill (or total sporting talent). For a given
wage bill, we are agnostic about the talent distribution across workers within
firm and we abstract from analyzing diversity and spillover eﬀects to focus
on the role of prejudice and the type of job oﬀers (perfect or imperfect).
Firms maximize team performance simply by minimizing the total cost of
talent given total resources. At any moment in time, we assume, for the sake
of simplicity, that total resources are exogenously determined by sponsorship,
past performances, and attendance in the stadium, among others. In the
steady state, each firm equalizes its wage bill to its total resources.
In this model, we do not detail how workers and firms are matched.
Once a random match is made, we endogenize the probability of oﬀering a
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perfect job oﬀer,  , to a worker based on the firm’s behavior. In general
there will be many causes leading particular firms to prefer one worker to
another, such as the role of appearance that will be considered below. For the
moment, the ensemble of hiring considerations is symbolized by the tension
between diverting a share (1 k) of the worker’s talent and seeing the worker
potentially poached by a rival firm at the rate  1 , which induces a positive
turnover cost c(t). This tension can be simply modeled by comparing the
expected costs of oﬀering a perfect (JP ) versus an imperfect (JI) contract to
a given worker with talent t:
JI = (1  k)t+ (  +  1 )(V   JI   c(t))
, JI = (1  k)t+ (  +  1 )(V   c(t))
r +   +  1 
, (7)
JP =  (V   JP   c(t)), JP =  (V   c(t))
r +  
. (8)
We assume that when a worker leaves the firm, a vacancy is created,
with V the value of a vacancy. However, because the turnover cost c(t) is
positive, the firm incurs a loss whenever a worker leaves. This happens either
through the exogenous separation process, which occurs at rate  , or because
a rival firm has poached the worker, which occurs at rate  1 . Equation (7)
states the tension between the loss that occurs from the player leaving or
being poached (V   JI   c(t)) and the gain from diverting part of the talent
(1  k)t. So, the firm will oﬀer a perfect job oﬀer if:21
JP > JI ,  (V   c(t))
r +  
>
(1  k)t+ (  +  1 )(V   c(t))
r +   +  1 
, c(t) > (1  k)t(r +  )
 1 r
. (9)
We assume that c follows a Pareto distribution with a lower turnover cost
bound c˜ and shape parameter ↵   0. This assumption implies a distribution
21We use a result that is standard in the search literature: in a steady-state equilibrium,
free entry ensures that the value of a vacancy is zero. Thus: V = 0.
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of turnover cost draws given by
G(c) =
⇣c
c˜
⌘ ↵
, c 2 [c˜,1].
The shape parameter ↵ indexes the dispersion of turnover cost draws.
The Pareto parametrization of c is intuitive because most turnover costs are
low, but as ↵ increases, the relative number of high turnover costs increases,
and the cost distribution becomes more concentrated at these higher cost
levels. Assuming that c is distributed Pareto and convex in talent,22 such
that c(t) = ct2, yields a simple closed-form solution for  . The probability of
receiving a perfect oﬀer is such that JP > JI :
 (t) =
✓
c˜ 1 rt
(r +  )(1  k)
◆↵
=
✓
c˜ 1rt
(r +  )(1  k)
◆ ↵
1 ↵
. (10)
As shown in equation (10), the probability   depends primarily on three
important variables,  1, k, and t, which govern diﬀerences in wages. Every-
thing else being equal,  1 determines the strength of the firm’s monopsony
power. For a high value of  1, firms are less likely to oﬀer low wages to their
employees because they anticipate that other firms can poach them. Thus,
a higher  1 decreases the number of employees that are stuck in imperfect
matches (see equation 5), and reduces the probability of being in an imperfect
match by increasing  .
The eﬀect of the other two parameters is straightforward. First, as k
increases, firms divert a smaller share of the monetary value of a worker’s
talent; therefore giving an imperfect oﬀer to a worker is less attractive. Sec-
ond, the higher is t, the more costly it is to replace talented workers, and the
higher is the probability to oﬀer a perfect job.
22The convexity of the turnover cost is empirically supported by the fact that star players
are more talented than journeymen and face a higher demand for their talents (Andreﬀ
(2014)).
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3.4 Employer prejudice
Considering that some firms hold a ‘taste’ for discrimination against type B
workers, Bowlus and Eckstein (2002) and Bowlus et al. (2001) assume that
the arrival rates ( s) and the job destruction rate ( ) vary according to the
type of worker (A and B). Accordingly, job oﬀer rates from prejudiced firms
are lower for B than for A workers. It seems natural to assume that, if an
employer does not like a particular type of worker, then lower eﬀorts would
be made by the employer and the worker to meet one another. This implies
that  i,A    i,B for i = 0, 1. Despite this natural assumption, we simplify the
analysis and assume that  s and   do not vary according to worker’s type,
such that  A =  B and  i =  i,A =  i,B for i = 0, 1.
This simplification has two main advantages. The first is abstracting
from explicit discriminatory hiring practices between types A and B. In
our approach, firms do not segregate type B versus type A. The second
reason is that models based on Mortensen (1988) have unrealistic, left-skewed
wage distributions. This problem does not occur in our model, as the wage
distribution depends on the distribution of talent.23
The   parameters reflect the general state of the labor market, and thus,
the potential constraints on labor mobility. Holding everything else con-
stant, lower constraints are associated with a higher arrival rate of job oﬀers.
Therefore, the end of both transfer fees for out-of-contract players and quotas
within the EU imply that players, independent of their race, receive a higher
number of job oﬀers from a larger number of firms after the Bosman ruling
than they did before. It is thus reasonable to assume that  1 is higher after
the ruling than before the ruling because of the diﬀerent states of the labor
market.24
In our approach, the prejudice applies to the separation rate. We assume
that the two groups of workers, A and B, diﬀer in their probability of drawing
a perfect match,  . They have diﬀerent Pareto distributions governing the
23Because talent and productivity are often Pareto distributed, adopting the same ap-
proach would give us a more plausible right-skewed distribution for wages.
24We may also consider diﬀerent values of  0 before and after the Bosman ruling, but
we abstract from this complication to focus our attention on the role of  1.
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turnover cost. In particular, we consider that c˜B = c˜A d, where d represents
the taste for discrimination and c˜ represents the lower bound cost, such that
the Pareto distribution of the turnover cost for B workers is shifted to the left.
In our labor context, this shift to the left reflects the taste for discrimination
d and the idea that a type B player who is unlikely to be a fan or manager
favorite will be less costly to let go or easier to replace. This assumption
implies a lower equilibrium probability of receiving a perfect job oﬀer ( ) for
workers in group B than in group A.
From this assumption on  , we can ground Szymanski’s market test. In
the steady-state, resources (R) are equal to the club’s wage bill (⌦), plus the
sum of realized turnover costs (C). We can write this down as:
R = ⌦ + C = (1  µ)( AtA + (1   A)ktA) + µ( BtB + (1   B)ktB) + C,
where µ is the share of black players in the squad, and ti is the talent of
an i = A,B type player. Consider mobility constraints (i.e., low  1) and
two teams with diﬀerent shares µ of black players but with same resources.
Because  B is lower, they will have a lower wage bill for the same talent. Thus,
firms that hire more black players increase their performance compared with
those that do not, which is exactly what Szymanski’s market test aims to
estimate.
3.5 Wage discrimination
Our perspective is that the Bosman ruling modifies the general state of the
labor market. It lowers the constraints on labor mobility and thus aﬀects
the arrival rate of job oﬀers for employed workers ( 1). We thus consider
the eﬀect of diﬀerent values of  1 on wage discrimination. We define wage
discrimination as the diﬀerence in expected wages between individuals in
groups A and B, such as:
EA(!|t)  EB(!|t) = buA + ktIA + tPA   buB   ktIB   tPB. (11)
After some algebraic manipulation (reported in appendix C.1) and given
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that both groups have the same likelihood of being out of work, equation (11)
reduces to
EA(w|t) EB(w|t) = t 0 ( A   B)
✓
(1  k)( 1 +  )
(  +  1 A)(  +  1 B)(  +  0)
◆
. (12)
In this expression, there is clearly no wage discrimination if  1 = 0 or
 A =  B, i.e., if job-to-job mobility is null or if the probability of receiving a
good job does not depend on the type of worker.
How does this wage discrimination vary when we modify the job oﬀer
arrival rate ( 1)? Everything else held equal, the eﬀect of a higher  1 on
discrimination is twofold: it decreases the steady-state share of individuals
in bad or imperfect matches I (see equation 5), and increases the likelihood
of receiving a perfect oﬀer,   (equation 10).
Overall, through  , the eﬀect of  1 on wage discrimination is non-linear.
For values of  1 close to 0, firms anticipate that their players cannot be
poached and both A and B players receive imperfect wage oﬀers. In this
extreme case, there is no discrimination because A and B players with the
same talent earn the same wage. As  1 increases, discrimination begins
to increase. Because all firms endogenize the taste for discrimination (i.e.,
 A    B), A players receive more perfect job oﬀers than B players, and
wage discrimination increases for a given level of talent. Then, as mobility
constraints continues to decrease, the process is reversed. B players begin
receiving a higher number of perfect job oﬀers. As a result, the gap nar-
rows and even disappears when constraints are suﬃciently low. Thus, the
relationship between  1 and wage discrimination follows an inverted-U shape
pattern. Formally we state this in Proposition (1).
Proposition 1. The diﬀerence in expected wage is a parabola that has a
single maximum. Wage discrimination first increases and then decreases with
constraints on job-to-job mobility.
Proof. Appendix (C.2) presents the proof.
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To gauge the eﬀect of mobility constraints on wage discrimination, we
simulate the eﬀect of an increase in  1 on EA(!|t) and EB(!|t) using plausible
parameter values.25 The simulated expected wages for workers of type A
(whites) and B (blacks) are reported in Figure (4).26 Interestingly, they are
both increasing with the job oﬀer arrival rate. Then, we report the diﬀerence
in expected wages for type B in Figure (5), which depicts the inverted-U
shape pattern proved in Proposition (1).
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Figure 4: Wage Expectation
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Figure 5: Wage discrimination
3.6 Job turnover
Our model also oﬀers strong predictions regarding the turnover of type A and
B workers, which explains the wage discrimination pattern. There exists an
optimal job oﬀer arrival rate (established in Appendix C.3), such that type
A workers change firms more often than B workers when below this rate,
and less often when above it. This optimal rate corresponds to the turning
point of wage discrimination identified in Figure (5).
The expression for job turnover in a given period is  1 I. For each group,
A (whites) and B (blacks), this expression yields an inverse U-shaped curve
25Although our labor market diﬀers from the one analyzed by Bowlus and Eckstein
(2002), we use their estimated values for  0 and   based on the National Longitudinal
Survey of Youth. The parameter values for the simulations are tabulated in Appendix (D).
26Values of  1 are low but consistent with the estimated values in Bowlus and Eckstein
(2002) and Bowlus, Kiefer, and Neumann (2001).
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linking  1 and job turnover. These curves are simulated and depicted in
Figure (6).
Figure 6: Job turnover
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There are two reasons that job turnover is low at both extremes of these
curves. Consider the case where  1 is low. First, workers already employed
have a small likelihood of moving. Second, when  1 is low, the probability of
receiving a perfect oﬀer ( ) is also low; hence, even when employed workers
receive a job oﬀer, it is likely to be imperfect and thus rejected.
Then, as  1 and   increase, players move to take advantage of the new
perfect job oﬀers. However, as  1 increases, a “stock” eﬀect comes into play:
workers are less likely to move simply because those who are employed in
an imperfect job become less numerous. Thus, two eﬀects explain why job
turnover follows an inverse U-shaped curve. As  1 increases, the pool of
workers who want to change clubs (I) decreases, as does the number of
moves ( I ). The diﬀerentiated turnover between A and B derives from the
diﬀerences in  s: the “stock” eﬀect emerges earlier for A than for type B
workers. This pattern is stated formally in Proposition (2).
Proposition 2. A decrease in constraints on job-to-job mobility causes a
racially diﬀerentiated change in job turnover.
Proof. Appendix (C.3) presents the proof.
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4 Empirical design
We first discuss how we move from our theory to empirics (4.1). We present
the market test to detect wage discrimination and discuss our data on racial
information, its sources and its limitations in subsection (4.2). We then
explain how we use the Bosman ruling, as a mobility shock, and present
some descriptive statistics (subsection 4.3). Finally, we detail the equations
that we estimate to evaluate the extent of race-based wage discrimination
(subsection 4.4).
4.1 Model predictions
Our theory predicts an inverted U-shape relationship between race-based
wage diﬀerentials and constraints on job-to-job mobility (see Proposition 1).
In moving from theory to estimation we face, however, one major issue. The
levels of mobility constraints in the European soccer market are unfortu-
nately not readily quantifiable. In lieu of quantifiable measures, we use the
Bosman ruling shock to infer information on the level of constraints. The
pre- and post-Bosman period were characterized by high and low constraints
on mobility, respectively. We expect the post-Bosman constraints to be suf-
ficiently low to eliminate pre-Bosman wage discrimination. This is all the
more possible given that European players may now receive job oﬀers from
all the EU clubs. The post-Bosman period is thus characterized by a much
higher  1, i.e., a higher arrival rate of job oﬀers for employed workers.
Our theory provides a plausible explanation of why wage discrimination
could have decreased post-Bosman despite prejudice against black players: as
the arrival rate of job oﬀers increases, wage discrimination decreases through
two diﬀerent channels. First, workers are more likely to receive “perfect”
job oﬀers. Second, the monopsony power of firms decreases because their
employees are more likely to be poached.
Another interesting aspect of our model is that it predicts a racially diﬀer-
entiated eﬀect on job turnover as constraints on job-to-job mobility decrease
(see Figure 6).
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4.2 The market test for discrimination
Our empirical analysis is based on Szymanski’s market test. The intuition
behind this test is simple: if all individual talent is perfectly rewarded, the
team’s performance (a function of talent) should be perfectly explained by
the team’s wage bill. Crucially, this performance should be independent of
the team’s racial composition when we control for the wage bill. By contrast,
for a given wage bill, if teams fielding an above-average proportion of black
players systematically outperform clubs with a below-average proportion of
black players, then the labor market may be unfair toward black players
(i.e., their talent is not fully rewarded and they face wage discrimination).
Szymanski’s market test is perfectly compatible with our theoretical frame-
work (see subsection 3.4). This test requires information on the skin-color of
players that we can match with extensive individual data, as well as data on
the wage bill of clubs. We explain how we collected and coded the data in
Appendix A.
4.3 The Bosman shock as a source of identification
We apply the market test for discrimination to a panel of all English clubs
in the top league from 1981 to 2008, and we explore the Bosman ruling as an
exogenous mobility shock to the European soccer labor market. The Bosman
ruling was decided on December 15, 1995, by the European Court of Justice.
This important decision lifted restrictions on soccer player mobility based
on the European Community Treaty of the free movement of labor (article
39). This decision had a profound eﬀect on transfers in the European soccer
market by banning restrictions on EU players in the EU’s national leagues
and by allowing players in the EU to move to another club at the end of their
contract without a transfer fee being paid.
Though this decision came into force in December 1995, it could have
been anticipated because this case had been submitted to the Court on Oc-
tober 6, 1993. Thus, in December 1993, the European Union of Football
Associations amended the regulations governing the Status and Transfer of
Football Players. This amendment provided that a player may enter into a
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contract with a new club when the contract between him and his club has
expired, has been rescinded or will expire within six months. However, the
two clubs were still forced to agree on a transfer fee with a specific action
in case of disagreement. To prevent any contamination of the results caused
by a possible anticipation, we omit the 1994-1995 and 1995-1996 seasons.
We thus compare the pre-Bosman era (1981-1993) to the post-Bosman era
(1996-2008) to identify the causal eﬀect of intensified mobility on racial dis-
crimination.
Exploiting this shock and using our extensive player data, we constructed
some informative descriptive statistics (see Appendices A and B for data
details). We have information on 3,788 players who participated in the first
English league during our two periods; 70% of those players are English.27
This number was higher before the Bosman ruling (93.2%) than after (52.6%)
it. In total, 10.7% of players are English and black; this number is fairly
stable before (9.9%) and after (11.2%) Bosman. However, the number of
black non-English players has skyrocketed from 0.8% before 1995 to 15%
after the ruling. The consequence is that the number of white English players
decreased from 83.3% before the ruling to 41.3% after the ruling.
Our strategy amounts to comparing black English to white English play-
ers to avoid comparing players of diﬀerent nationalities. Table (1) reports
average characteristics for black and white English players in the first league,
both before and after the Bosman ruling. We observe in the pre-Bosman pe-
riod that black players did not play more matches than white players. By
contrast, black players were slightly more qualified, one year younger and a
bit more tenured. In the post-Bosman era, we observe notable changes: the
quality diﬀerence is statistically insignificant and black players are now less
tenured than white players. Interestingly, all the diﬀerences in diﬀerences
are significant between the two periods. In the post-Bosman era, players
on average played less matches, are qualitatively better, are more than 6
months older and have one-half semester more of tenure. Those statistics
27We use the term English for the sake of comparison with Szymanski (2000), but a
minority of those players are Irish, Scottish or Welsh. Considering these players together
with English players makes sense in our context because these players were not considered
foreigners in the English soccer market and were thus not subject to the foreign quotas.
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clearly show that there was a Bosman eﬀect on players and that this change
diﬀered along racial lines.
Table 1: Individual diﬀerences in means: black vs white English players
Pre-Bosman (1981-1993) Post-Bosman (1996-2008) Overall
Variable Black White Diﬀ. Black White Diﬀ. D. in D.
Player’s number of matches 20.79 20.46 .33 18.29 17.70 .59c 2.68a
[9.3] [9.6] (.37) [8.3] [8.6] (.30) (.18)
Player’s quality level 2.42 2.24 .18b 2.88 2.78 .10 -.54a
[1.9] [2.1] (.08) [1.9] [1.9] (.07) (.04)
Age of players 23.79 24.87 -1.08a 24.92 25.59 -0.67a -.71a
[4.0] [4.4] (.16) [4.7] [5.0] (.17) (.09)
Tenure (in years) 2.50 2.38 .12a 2.4 2.72 -.32a -.25a
[1.2] [1.2] (.05) [1.1] [1.8] (.07) (.03)
Observations 737 5152 980 3531
Notes: This table reports average characteristics for black and white English players in the first league. ‘Diﬀ.’
means diﬀerence in means between blacks and whites; ‘D. in D.’ means diﬀerence in diﬀerence between pre- and
post-Bosman period. Standard deviations are in brackets; standard errors are reported in parentheses, with a, b
and c denoting significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
The diﬀerence between the pre- and post-Bosman eras is also observed
in Table (2) using club statistics. All diﬀerences in terms of budget, transfer
fee records and average attendance are highly significant both economically
and statistically. The only exception is the share of black English players,
which is constant in both eras.
Table 2: Club diﬀerences in means
Variable Pre-Bosman Post-Bosman Diﬀerence
(1981-1993) (1996-2008)
Budget (in millions of pounds) 2,9 35,5 32,6a
[2,4] [25.5] (1,5)
Transfer fee record (in millions) 1,31 8,96 7,65a
[1,3] [6,5] (0,38)
Average attendance (in thousands) 21,5 33,2 11,7a
[8,9] [12,0] (0,9)
Share of black English players 0.13 0.14 0.01
[.1] [.1] (0.01)
Observations 304 258
Notes: This table reports average characteristics for English first league clubs. ‘Diﬀerence’
means diﬀerence in means between pre- and post-Bosman period. Standard deviations are in
brackets; standard errors are reported in parentheses, with a denoting significance at the 1%
level.
As mentioned above, we should also expect a racially diﬀerentiated change
in job turnover to accompany a change in the job oﬀer arrival rate. In our
empirical context, we define job turnover as club transfers, i.e., moving from
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one club to another during a given season. Figure (7) contrasts the turnover
of black (B) and white (A) English players by comparing their share in the
total number of transfers with respect to their share in the total population.
The variable analyzed is the following:
Turnover =
Share in transfersB
Share in populationB
  Share in transfersA
Share in populationA
.
This variable is positive if black players change clubs more often in a
given year than their white colleagues and negative if they do not.
Figure 7: Relative turnover of black English players
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As shown in Figure (7), before the Bosman ruling, white players tended to
change clubs more often than black players, but this tendency was reversed
after Bosman.28 This reversed trend suggests that black players “voted with
their feet” when the market was liberalized. We also find evidence, presented
in Appendix (E), that young black players took advantage of the new ruling
to change clubs when they could have been discriminated against. How did all
these changes aﬀect wage discrimination? In the next subsection, we present
the specifications that will enable us to estimate whether wage discrimination
is present in the soccer labor market.
28It is unclear, however, when precisely this trend reversed. This may be because we
imperfectly observe club transfers. We have data on the first division only, so what we are
measuring are transfers within the first division. This may explain our outlying data point
for the season 1991-1992, a season where four clubs were promoted and whose transfers
were not perfectly captured.
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4.4 Estimated equations
To apply Szymanski’s test, relating a club’s performance to its wage bill and
its share of black English players, we use two diﬀerent measures of perfor-
mance. The first measure is based on league rankings as in Szymanski’s
paper. The second is based on match results. In both cases, we corrobo-
rate Szymanski’s finding of apparent wage discrimination in the pre-Bosman
era. We find, however, that wage discrimination has disappeared in the post-
Bosman era. This is consistent with our theoretical predictions on the eﬀect
of relaxed mobility constraints.
The league performance specification
League Performanceit = ↵i +  1(WageBillit  WageBillt)
+  2(PlayersNbit   PlayersNbt)
+  3(Shareblackit   Shareblackt) + ✏it. (13)
League Performanceit, is computed in relative terms as
⇣
Rankingit mint
maxt mint
⌘
,
where Rankingit is the final ranking of team i at the end of season t; and
min and max are the lowest and highest possible rankings each season. ↵i
is a team i fixed eﬀect, capturing permanent team-specific characteristics
aﬀecting performance, such as a location eﬀect,29 and ✏it is the usual error
term. The team’s wage bill (WageBillit  WageBillt) is measured as the log
diﬀerence of the club wage bill relative to the annual average (WageBillt).
The relative number of players (PlayerNbit   PlayerNbt) is computed as the
diﬀerence between the number of players used in a season t and a club i
relative to the average. Controlling for a club fixed eﬀect and time-varying
wage bill, the relative number of players variable captures “bad luck,” as
high turnover typically reflects a high level of injuries sustained. Finally, the
relative share of black players (Shareblackit Shareblackt) is measured as the
share of black players’ appearances for a team in a given season t relative to
29Some players could prefer to live in London rather than Liverpool for instance, which
would allow London-based clubs to have better performances for lower wage bills.
27
the annual average (Shareblackt). We compute this ratio based only on the
share of black English players (including Irish, Scottish and Welsh players -
see footnote 27). The share of black English players is relatively stable over
time, but the share of black non-English players is constantly rising, which
would lead us to estimate discrimination toward diﬀerent individuals before
and after Bosman. We later discuss results based on both black and white
non-English players.
The coeﬃcient of interest to us is  3, the eﬀect of the share of black
English players on performance. In case of race based wage discrimination,
we expect  3 to be positive.30
The match performance specification
One drawback of the team performance measure based on final rankings
is the relatively limited number of observations. We thus consider a new de-
pendent variable based on match results that oﬀers many more observations:
Match Performanceijt = ⇠ij +  1 log(WageBillit/WageBilljt)
+  2(PlayersNbit   PlayersNbjt)
+  3(Shareblackit   Shareblackjt) + eijt, (14)
Match Performanceijt between the home team i and the away team j in
year t is simply the goal diﬀerence in their match. Using this new variable,
we apply the same idea to test for discrimination: for a given diﬀerence
in the wage bill between teams i and j, a team i with a higher share of
black players should not consistently outperform (in terms of goals) a team
j with a lower share. By contrast, we expect a large diﬀerence in wage
bills, which explains a large diﬀerence in sporting talent, to lead to a large
diﬀerence in performance (i.e., in goals scored). The match performance is
conditioned on a match fixed eﬀect (⇠ij) and eijt is the usual error term.
Our wage bill variable is the log diﬀerence between the wage bills of the two
30Compared with Szymanski, our transformation of the dependent variable implies, more
intuitively, that in case of discrimination, an increase in the relative share of black players
raises team’s performance.
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clubs, log
 
WageBillit/WageBilljt
 
. We also add the diﬀerence in the number
of players used (PlayersNbit   PlayersNbjt). Our variable of interest is the
diﬀerence between the two teams in the share of matches played by black
English players (Shareblackit   Shareblackjt).31 The results are presented
below.
5 Empirical results
We estimate models (13) and (14) with diﬀerent panel data techniques in
subsections (5.1) and (5.2), respectively. The combination of diﬀerent speci-
fications and estimators reinforces the robustness of our results.
5.1 Discrimination market test on league performance
We first use the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimator and the fixed-eﬀects
“within” estimator to eliminate the individual eﬀect (↵i), with standard errors
robust to club clustering (to allow for a correlation of the error within clubs
across years). We then instrument for the wage bill by relying on the within-
IV approach and the GMM estimator (Arellano and Bond, 1991). The latter
estimator is useful because it eliminates the club fixed eﬀects (through first-
diﬀerencing) and allows for a wide panel of instruments at the expense of
removing some observations from our sample.
Estimation by OLS and Within
In Table (3), we first show our pre- and post-Bosman results using the
discrimination market test on league rankings (equation 13) without instru-
menting for the wage bill. The relative wage bill variable has a positive eﬀect
on performance, which is economically and statistically significant. Unsur-
prisingly, this eﬀect is larger if we do not control for the club fixed eﬀect.
The relative number of players used exhibits a negative eﬀect in line with
“bad luck” because high turnover typically reflects a high level of injuries sus-
31Unfortunately, we do not have team sheet data that would enable us to control the
number of black players that are on the pitch at the match level.
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tained. As expected, we find contrasting results across the two periods for our
estimate of interest, the share of black English players. In the pre-Bosman
era (columns 1 and 2), we find that performance depends significantly on the
team’s racial composition, suggesting apparent discrimination. Therefore,
teams fielding an above-average proportion of black players outperform clubs
with a below-average proportion of black players. After Bosman (columns
3 and 4), the apparent wage discrimination disappears. Performance is now
independent of the racial composition of teams. This result is consistent
with our theoretical predictions on the eﬀect of relaxed mobility constraints
on wage discrimination.
Table 3: Market-test: League Performance and Discrimination - OLS and Within
Dependent Variable: League Performance
Sample: Pre-Bosman (1981-1993) Post-Bosman (1996-2008)
Estimator: OLS Within OLS Within
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative log wage bill 0.509a 0.396a 0.474a 0.157b
(0.05) (0.12) (0.04) (0.08)
Share of black English players employed 0.577a 0.491b -0.130 -0.000
(0.18) (0.25) (0.15) (0.20)
Relative number of players used -0.025a -0.031a -0.026a -0.027a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 262 259 258 251
R2 0.438 0.606
Club fixed eﬀect No Yes No Yes
Notes: the dependent variable is computed in relative terms as
⇣
Rankingit mint
maxt mint
⌘
, where Rankingit is the final
ranking of team i at the end of season t; and min and max are the lowest and highest possible rankings each season.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by club, with a, b denoting significance at the 1% and 5% level
respectively.
How economically meaningful is the estimate of discrimination in the
pre-Bosman period? Let us compare the 1993 situation of two clubs that are
identical except in their share of black English players: (1) a club that does
not employ black players, and (2) a club that employs 3.7 black players (the
1993 average number). Based on our estimates, we find that to obtain the
same performance with equally talented white players, the club that does not
employ black players should pay 800,000 pounds more than the other club.
This value amounts to 15% of the average wage bill in 1993.
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Estimation by Within-IV and GMM
Are our results plagued by endogeneity issues? Two possible problems are
worth mentioning: (1) the potential mismeasurement of the wage bills, and
(2) the fact that bonuses result in reverse causation because a higher perfor-
mance may induce higher bonuses and thus a higher wage bill (if salary is
incentive based). To address these problems, which could bias the estimate
of the share of black players, we use an instrumental variable (IV) approach.
We instrument the wage bill with the lagged performance on cups, lagged
attendance, and relative record transfer fees.32 The key identifying assump-
tion is that these variables do not aﬀect league performance, except through
their eﬀect on the wage bill.
We briefly discuss the relevance of our three excluded instruments before
presenting the results. First, good performance in cups in the previous season
generates higher revenues in the contemporaneous season. Then, there is a
strong link between the previous season attendance in the stadium and the
current season resources and wage bill. Finally, we use record transfer fees
to capture potential buyouts by rich owners. New owners often break the
club’s transfer fee record, but these purchases often have little eﬀect on final
performance. Many record purchases prove to be poor value for money, and
the eﬀect of transfer fees on performance are insignificant when controlling
for the budget.
The instruments are constructed as follows. Relative lagged attendance
is measured as the one-year lag of a club’s attendance relative to the annual
average. Performance in cups is measured as the one-year lag club perfor-
mance in the Football Association Challenge Cup and the League Cup. The
relative transfer fee record variable is measured as the diﬀerence in a club’s
transfer fee record in a given season relative to the annual average.
The first-stage of the within-IV results are reported in Table 9 (see Ap-
pendix F) and show that these instruments have a significant eﬀect on the
relative log wage bill, except for the lagged cup performance in the post-
Bosman era. The second-stage of the within-IV results are presented in
columns (1) and (3) of Table (4). These results confirm the post-Bosman
32Data are constructed from newspaper articles and online sources.
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eﬀect. Whereas the coeﬃcient for the share of black players employed is
positive and significant before the Bosman ruling, it is insignificant post-
Bosman.
Table 4: Market-test: League Performance and Discrimination - IV and GMM
Dependent Variable: League Performance
Sample: Pre-Bosman (1981-1993) Post-Bosman (1996-2008)
Estimator: Within-IV AB Within-IV AB
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative log wage bill 0.335 0.576a 0.200c 0.472a
(0.25) (0.10) (0.12) (0.04)
Share of black English players employed 0.501b 1.364b -0.111 -0.116
(0.25) (0.54) (0.18) (0.48)
Number of players used -0.030a -0.036c -0.027a -0.010
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 259 262 247 257
Number of clubs 38 41 31 39
Number of instruments 3 28 3 30
AR1 p-value 0 0
AR2 p-value 0.70 0.37
Hansen p-value 0.72 0.47 0.15 0.48
Notes: the dependent variable is computed in relative terms as
⇣
Rankingit mint
maxt mint
⌘
, where Rankingit is the final
ranking of team i at the end of season t; and min and max are the lowest and highest possible rankings each season.
AB means Arellano-Bond. Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered by club, with a, b, and c denoting
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% percent level, respectively.
The IV results could be aﬀected by a weak instrument problem. If the
instruments correlate only weakly with the endogenous explanatory variable,
then statements of statistical significance may be misleading. However, the
first stage F-statistics on the excluded instruments are above the recom-
mended threshold of 10 (see Table 9 in appendix F). It is also reassuring
that the standard errors on the second-stage estimates are not much larger
than those in the within model of Table (3). Moreover, the instruments pass
standard validity assessments. The F-test of joint significance of the excluded
exogenous variables is rejected at the 1% level. The test of overidentifying re-
strictions for the excluded instruments is also passed and the Angrist-Pischke
first-stage chi-squared statistics reject the null of underidentification (Angrist
and Pischke, 2009).
In columns (2) and (4) of Table (4), we use the two-step generalized
method of moments (GMM) approach of Arellano and Bond (1991). This
estimator diﬀerences away time-invariant club specific eﬀects. It relies on the
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dynamic structure of the model for identification by using lagged levels of
the independent variables as instruments for current diﬀerences. A problem
with GMM estimators is that their validity is subject to the use of a relatively
small or large number of instruments. A large number generates implausibly
low values of Hansen tests of instruments exogeneity (Roodman, 2009), while
using too few instruments is likely to generate a weak instruments problem
and to deliver inaccurate estimates. Following Roodman’s (2009) rule of
thumb, the number of instruments is strictly lower than the number of clubs
(groups) in the sample. This strikes a balance between estimate consistency
and test validity. The diagnostic tests (Hansen and first and second order
autocorrelation) presented at the bottom of the table reveal no evidence
against the validity of the instruments used by the GMM estimator.
The GMM estimates of the share of black English players employed pro-
duce the same result as the other estimators: wage discrimination appears
to be significant before the Bosman ruling but not after the ruling. Again,
these results are consistent with our theoretical predictions on the eﬀect of
relaxed mobility constraints.
Before using match data, which allows for more statistical power to run
the discrimination market test, we present a further test that supports our
claim that the Bosman shock is driving the decrease in discrimination. This
test is on the diﬀerences between black English and black foreign players.
Diﬀerences between English and foreign black players
We investigate the eﬀect of the Bosman ruling on diﬀerent categories of
foreign players. Although the Bosman ruling lifted quotas for EU players,
non-EU players are still subject to restrictive contracting conditions. For
instance, to obtain a UK work permit, non-EU players must fulfill a set of
stringent conditions.33 As a consequence, despite a general decrease in labor
mobility constraints, mobility should be relatively more constrained for non-
33The rule is that the player must have played at least 75% of his national team’s
competitive matches over the last two years and that his national team must be in the
top 70 countries in the world. The appeals process allows for some flexibility in the rules,
but the non-EU nationals playing in the Premier League are still expected to be of high
quality.
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EU players even after the Bosman ruling. We expect black non-EU players,
since they are more constrained, to still face wage discrimination. We find
evidence of wage discrimination against black non-EU players by performing
the market test after Bosman on diﬀerent shares of players: black English,
EU black, non-EU black, and non-EU white.34 Results are reported in Ta-
ble (5). We find that the coeﬃcients for the share of non-EU black players
are significant and positive after Bosman, even if its statistical significance
is lower when we introduce club fixed eﬀects (col. 3 and 4). Those coeﬃ-
cients imply that wage discrimination against black non-EU players could be
present in the English first league post-Bosman.
Table 5: Post-Bosman: are non-EU black players discriminated? (1996-2008)
Dependent Variable: League Performance
Estimator: OLS IV Within Within-IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Relative wage bill 0.461a 0.475a 0.144b 0.111
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.13)
Share of black English players employed -0.060 -0.051 0.095 0.096
(0.13) (0.13) (0.20) (0.20)
Share of black EU players employed 0.056 0.029 0.125 0.174
(0.20) (0.20) (0.31) (0.32)
Share of black non-EU players employed 0.550a 0.566a 0.587c 0.613c
(0.20) (0.20) (0.34) (0.34)
Share of white non-EU players employed 0.082 0.073 0.256 0.267
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.16)
Relative number of players used -0.026a -0.025a -0.026a -0.026a
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 157 157 251 249
Club fixed eﬀect No Yes No Yes
Notes: the dependent variable is computed in relative terms as
⇣
Rankingit mint
maxt mint
⌘
, where Rankingit is
the final ranking of team i at the end of season t; and min and max are the lowest and highest possible
rankings each season. Robust standard errors in parentheses, with a, b, and c denoting significance at
the 1%, 5%, and 10% percent level, respectively. Standard errors are clustered by club. The first-stage
for the Within-IV (col. 4) is quite comparable with the one reported in Table (9) of Appendix (F)
and available upon request with the corresponding usual statistics.
5.2 Discrimination Market-test on Match Performance
To test the robustness of our results, we employ a new methodology to detect
discrimination based on a diﬀerent performance variable: the discrimination
34Non-EU players are non-member players of the common market or the European free
trade association zone. We do not report results for the pre-Bosman period, as there were
few non-English black players playing in England (see section 4.3).
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market test on matches (see equation 14). For the sake of simplification, we
use our two preferred estimators for this purpose: ‘Within’ and ‘Within-IV’.
This approach implies that for all estimations we include a dyadic fixed eﬀect
controlling for the pair of clubs involved in the match. We are thus exploiting
the time series variation in our panel by measuring the eﬀect of diﬀerences
in the racial composition of the teams on the diﬀerence in performance. We
first present results on long time spans 1981-1993 versus 1996-2008, and then,
on short time spans 1989-1994 versus 1995-2000.
Pre- versus post-Bosman periods: long time spans
The results on the pre-Bosman (1981-1993) and the post-Bosman (1996-
2008) periods are reported in Table (6). In all regressions, standard errors
are two-way clustered at the match and the receiving club level, to allow for
a correlation of the error within matches across years, and within receiving
clubs across years (e.g., any specific trend at home). We consider that the
matchij between team i and team j is in the same cluster as ji because a
common trend may influence the score of some club pairings independently
of which club is receiving or visiting. Note that the results hold for diﬀerent
ways of clustering the standard errors.
Using match level data, we confirm the evidence that discrimination is
present before Bosman and disappears after the ruling. The estimates of
the diﬀerence in the share of black players can be interpreted as follows.
Consider two teams with the same wage bill and zero black players. The
teams’ expected result is a draw. However, before Bosman (columns 1 and
2), a team that switched all its players for black players could expect to
win the match by one goal. In other words, because of wage discrimination,
the club with only black players can hire more talented players. A similar
eﬀect could be achieved by doubling the wage budget. By contrast, the non-
significant coeﬃcients of the diﬀerence in the share of black players, reported
in columns (3) and (4), suggest that wage discrimination has disappeared
post-Bosman.
As before, we instrument the wage bill in order to account for possi-
ble measurement errors and reverse causality. In columns (2) and (4), we
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Table 6: Market-test: Match Performance and Discrimination - Within and Within-IV
Dependent Variable: Match Performance
Sample: Pre-Bosman (1981-1993) Post-Bosman (1996-2008)
Estimator: Within Within-IV Within Within-IV
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Diﬀerence in log wage bill 0.701a 1.546a 0.491a 0.330
(0.18) (0.47) (0.12) (0.27)
Diﬀerence in black players employed 0.854b 1.079b -0.148 0.039
(0.33) (0.43) (0.31) (0.40)
Diﬀerence in players used -0.048a -0.054a -0.030a -0.031a
Observations 4494 3129 4402 3264
Hansen p-value 0.79 0.22
Club-pair fixed eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: the dependent variable is the goal diﬀerence in the match. Robust standard errors in parentheses with
a denoting significance at the 1% percent level. Standard errors are two-way clustered at the visiting and
receiving club level (see text for details).
instrument the diﬀerence in wage bills between the two clubs in a match
with the corresponding diﬀerence in the instrument variables used in subsec-
tion (5.1). The result of the first-stage estimates are reported in Table (10)
in Appendix F. The instruments pass the standard validity assessments (see
the bottom of Table 10). The F-test of joint significance of the excluded ex-
ogenous variables is rejected at the 1% level and is above the recommended
threshold of 10. The test of overidentifying restrictions for the excluded
instruments is also passed and the Angrist-Pischke first-stage chi-squared
statistics reject the null of underidentification (Angrist and Pischke, 2009).
Moreover, it is again reassuring that the standard errors on the second-stage
estimates (col. 2 and 4) are not much larger than those in the within model
(col. 1 and 3, respectively).
Pre- versus post-Bosman periods: short time spans
One of the advantages of this new dependent variable is that we have many
more observations, and so we can run our regressions on smaller time win-
dows. In Table (7), we estimate equation (14) using the within estimator.35
We check the extent of discrimination before and after the Bosman ruling by
using 5-year time windows with two scenarios: (1) 1989-1993 vs. 1996-2000
and (2) 1990-1994 vs. 1995-1999. In the first scenario, we drop the years
35Results using the Within-IV are qualitatively similar and available upon request.
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1994 and 1995 to avoid any anticipation eﬀect (see section 4.3), while in the
second case we include these two years to stress how dramatic the change in
discrimination is following the Bosman ruling.
In the Bosman ruling period (col. 1 and 2), the estimates of the share of
black English players are positive, significant and higher than in the 1981-
1993 time frame (see col. 1 and 2 of Table 6). This seems to indicate that
discrimination was increasing in the years leading up to the Bosman ruling.
As expected by our theory, we find that the estimates of the share of black
English players employed are statistically insignificant in the 5 years following
the Bosman ruling (col. 3 and 4). This sharp contrast, when using smaller
time windows, supports the idea that only a profound change in labor market
conditions could have brought down discrimination this quickly.36
Table 7: Market-test: Match Performance and Discrimination - Within and Within-IV
Dependent Variable: Match Performance
Sample: Pre-Bosman Post-Bosman
(1990-1994) (1989-1993) (1995-1999) (1996-2000)
Estimator: Within Within Within Within
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Diﬀerence in log wage bill 0.517c 0.717b 0.432c 0.389a
(0.29) (0.33) (0.26) (0.13)
Diﬀerence in black players employed 1.409a 1.203b -0.820 -0.591
(0.45) (0.55) (0.58) (0.70)
Diﬀerence in players used -0.035a -0.035a -0.039a -0.027b
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Observations 1898 1726 1558 1571
Club-pair fixed eﬀect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: the dependent variable is the goal diﬀerence in the match. Robust standard errors in parentheses with
a, b, and c denoting significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% percent level, respectively. Standard errors are two-way
clustered at the match and the receiving club level (see text for details).
36This change is remarkable when we consider that contracts for soccer players last
around 3 to 4 years. Some players were thus not immediately able to move from one club
to another after the Bosman ruling. We may therefore expect the discrimination coeﬃcient
to decrease more slowly. We tested for this possibility by interacting the share of black
English players with a year trend in our Post-Bosman regression, and found a negative
trend that was only significant at the 10% level (results are available upon request). An
alternative to moving is, however, to renegotiate the contract to avoid being poached
by other clubs. This renegotiation is quite frequent post-Bosman and typically leads to
increases in wage and contract length.
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6 Conclusion
In this paper, we find strong evidence that wage discrimination has become
insignificant following a decrease in labor market frictions. Given the empir-
ical results, we feel confident stating that the Bosman ruling decreased and
even eradicated the black-white wage gap for black English players in the
Premier League. As shown in our model, a strong decrease in labor market
frictions can erode the monopsony power of firms, potentially leading to a
decrease in apparent discrimination. Our model appears to fit the empirical
facts quite well.
A heartening interpretation of our results is that the proper labor market
conditions can cause wage diﬀerentials between white and black employees
to disappear even if racist attitudes remain.
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A Data appendix
Our dataset contains all professional soccer players, regardless of nationality,
from the first English league from 1981 to 2008 and comes from Kleven,
Landais, and Saez (2013). To this dataset we add the following variables.
Wage bills. We use wage bills from the Companies House website, a British
government agency that collects annual reports from registered companies.
Precise wage data are provided for almost all the English clubs in our sample.
We are missing some data from clubs who have gone bankrupt during the
season, such as Crystal Palace in 1998 or Leicester City in 2001, or from
clubs that did not report wage bills in their financial accounts.
These wage data are considered reliable because they are obtained from
audited annual accounts. There are some issues however. First, the reports
are not homogeneous over the 30-year period. Some clubs changed the ending
date on their company accounts and reports annual results over thirteen or
more months of data, in which case the data were adjusted on a pro rata
basis. Then, we do not know what proportion of the pay is incentive related
(e.g., bonuses for performing well in a cup competition) and what proportion
is fixed. Finally, the wage bill is given for all staﬀ, including salaries for
scouts, statisticians, physiotherapists, and coaches. However, this practice
is unlikely to be a problem because the pay for most of these employees is
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relatively small compared with the total wages of players and likely accounts
for a similar share of the wage bills in all clubs.
Racial information. The race information was coded from an examina-
tion of players’ photographs into categories of either black or not black (which
we refer to as white).37 This method might sound arbitrary because we code
players as “black” if they appear to be “black”. However, this method is
actually a good way to model the potential for discrimination because dis-
criminators prejudge an individual based on appearances (Palacios-Huerta,
2014).38 These pictures were obtained primarily from the reputable website
transfermarkt.de, and when pictures from that site were not available, we
conducted Internet searches. We obtained pictures for nearly all the players
in our sample. The players whose photos were missing were primarily youth
team players who had had little game time and could thus be discarded from
our analysis.
Control variables. In addition to information on race and wage bill, we
have precise data on nationality, age, the number of matches played, the
number of goals scored, national team selections (and their level - youth,
A, ...), and whether a player participated in the World Cup. We use these
last measures to create an objective, albeit imperfect, measure of quality of
the players (see Appendix B). Moreover, we added information on team’s
ranking and attendance from the European soccer statistics website.
B Sporting talent and wage bill
In order to check whether a team’s talent is well measured by its wage bill, we
create a team index that sums the talent of each team’s player. This index
is computed for each team based on the total number of matches played in
the Premier League by their players, their age, and whether team’s players
are selected by their national team, and at what level (youth team, B team,
A team). This variable is a crude measure for the team’s sporting talent,
37Our full coding protocol is available upon request.
38For an explanation of why this appearance-based method is appropriate, Palacios-
Huerta (2014) considers the case of the legendary Manchester United player Ryan Giggs.
He appears to be Caucasian, and it was unlikely that he faced discrimination as a pro-
fessional player during his career because discriminators prejudge an individual based on
appearances. However, after he became famous, he publicly revealed that he had been
victim of racism as a child because of his father’s skin color. This revelation came as a
surprise to his fans.
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but gives a rather sensible proxy for the quality of the team. As an example,
the best performers, identified in Figure (3), which are Arsenal, Chelsea,
Liverpool and Manchester United, are also the best teams in terms of quality
with the highest wage bills. A regression of the average team’s quality on
average wage bill gives a R-squared of 0.81. The wage bill does control quite
accurately for the team’s sporting talent.
Figure 8: Average Wage Bill and Team’s Quality
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C Proofs and derivations
C.1 A formula for wage discrimination
In this appendix we detail how we obtain the formula for wage discrimina-
tion (12). Let define the wage discrimination as the diﬀerence in expected
wages between individuals in groups A and B, such as:
D = EA(!|t)  EB(!|t) = buA + ktIA + tPA   buB   ktIB   tPB. (15)
We can simplify this expression since both types have the same likelihood
of being out of work. Thus, the expression for discrimination D is:
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(  +  1 A)(  +  1 B)(  +  0)
+
 0( A    B)
( 0 +  )
◆
= kt
✓
 0 ( B    A)(  1    )
(  +  1 A)(  +  1 B)(  +  0)
◆
+t
✓
 0 ( A    B)( 1 +   +  1 B +  1 A) +  0 1 ( 2B    2A)
(  +  1 A)(  +  1 B)(  +  0)
◆
= t 0 ( A    B)
✓
(k ⇤ (  +  1)) + ( 1 +   +  1 B +  1 A)   1( B +  A)
(  +  1 A)(  +  1 B)(  +  0)
◆
,
which amounts to the equation (12)
D = EA(!|t)  EB(!|t) = t 0 ( A    B)
✓
(1  k)( 1 +  )
(  +  1 A)(  +  1 B)(  +  0)
◆
.
C.2 Proof of proposition 1
Proposition 1: The diﬀerence in expected wage is a parabola that
has a single maximum. Wage discrimination first increases and
then decreases with constraints on job-to-job mobility.
Proof. We look at the maximum and minimum of the equation D (12), de-
rived in appendix (C.1), by taking the derivative of this function with respect
to  1:
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@D
@ 1
= t
 0 ↵
(1  ↵) 1(  +  0) ( A    B)
✓
(1  k)( 1 +  )
(  +  1 A)(  +  1 B)
◆
+ t
 0 (1  k)
(  +  0)
( A    B)
⇥
0@  2     ↵1 ↵   1 ( A +  B)   21(↵+11 ↵ ) B A    
⇣
 ( 11 ↵ )( A +  B) +  1(
2↵
1 ↵ + 2) B A
⌘
[(  +  1 A)(  +  1 B)]
2
1A
= t
 0 
 1(  +  0)(1  k) ( A    B)
 
( ↵1 ↵ )( 1 +  )( 
2 +   1( A +  B) +  21 A B)
[(  +  1 A)(  +  1 B)]
2
+
 1
h
 2   ( ↵1 ↵ ) 1 ( A +  B)   21(↵+11 ↵ ) B A    
⇣
 ( 11 ↵ )( A +  B) +  1(
2↵
1 ↵ + 2) B A
⌘i
((  +  1 A)(  +  1 B))2
1A
= t
 0 (1  k)
 1(  +  0)
( A    B)
0@  2
⇣
( 1 +  )
↵
1 ↵ +  1
⌘
   2 1( A +  B) +  21 A B(↵   1 2 1 ↵ )
[(  +  1 A)(  +  1 B)]
2
1A . (16)
In order to study the sign of this expression, we only need to study the
sign of the second fraction of 16, since we consider cases where  A    B.
Consider the numerator of the second fraction:
 2
✓
( 1 +  )
↵
1  ↵ +  1
◆
   2 1( A +  B) +  21 A B
✓
↵     1   2 
1  ↵
◆
=
1
1  ↵
 
 2 [ 1(1  (1  ↵)( A +  B)) +  ↵] +  21 A B [(↵  2)     1]
 
.
We need to study the variation of the following equation in order to
understand the sign of the derivative of equation (12):
 2 1 (1  (1  ↵)( A +  B)) +  21 A B [(↵  2)     1] +  3↵. (17)
Rewriting  A as
⇣
 
↵
1 ↵
1 yA
⌘
we get:
 2 1(1  (1  ↵) 
↵
1 ↵
1 (yA + yB)) +  
2↵
1 ↵+2
1 yAyB((↵  2)     1)) +  3↵.
Taking the derivative once more, we get
 2    2 
↵
1 ↵
1 (yA + yB) 
2
1  ↵ 
2↵
1 ↵+1
1 yAyB(2  ↵)   
3  ↵
1  ↵ 
2↵
1 ↵
1 yAyB.
This function is positive when  1 is 0, and then monotonically decreases
as  1 increases. We should therefore expect function 17 to increase and then
decrease. Notice, that when  1 is 0, equation 17 is positive and equal to  3↵.
For higher values of  1 (e.g.  1 = 1), this value is then negative. We can then
establish that the function 17 is first positive, then negative at some value
of  1. It follows that there will be a single value for which the derivative
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is equal to 0, and that below this value, equation 16 will be positive, and
negative above it. Hence, the diﬀerence in expected wage will be a parabola
with a single maximum.
C.3 Proof of proposition 2
Proposition 2: A decrease in constraints on job-to-job mobility
causes a racially diﬀerentiated change in job turnover.
Proof. We need to find how the diﬀerence in moves evolves with  1, i.e.,
study the sign of: DM =  1 BIB    1 AIA
DM =
 1 B 0(1   B) 
(  +  1 B)(  +  0)
   1 A (1   A) 
(  +  1 A)(  +  0)
=
 1 B 0(1   B) (  +  1 A)   1 A 0(1   A) (  +  1 B)
(  +  1 B)(  +  0)(  +  1 A)
=
 1  0[ B(1   B)(  +  1 A)   A(1   A)(  +  1 B)]
(  +  1 B)(  +  0)(  +  1 A)
=
 1  0[ B     2B     1 A 2B    A  +  2A  +  1 B 2A]
(  +  1 B)(  +  0)(  +  1 A)
.
If we want to find the crossing point, either  1 is 0, or [ B     2B   
 1 A 2B  A + 2A + 1 B 2A] is 0. This gives us the formula for the crossing
point:
 ⇤1 =
 [ B( B   1) +  A(1   A)]
 B A( A    B) .
Considering the case where 0 <  A <  B < 1, above  ⇤1 group B individ-
uals change firms more often than individuals from group A and vice versa.
The crossing point is above 0 whenever  A B>
1  B
1  A .
D Parameters for the simulations
Even though our labor market is very diﬀerent to the one analyzed by Bowlus
and Eckstein (2002), we use the same values for the parameters common in
both papers. Our specification imposes an ↵ between 0 and 1. Although the
expectation of c is not defined in this case, we do not use this expectation in
our analysis since firms directly observe the realization of c.
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Table 8: Parameter values for the simulations
Parameters Values
k 0.5
 0 0.04
  0.004
t 150
↵W 0.8
↵B 0.8
c˜W 0.05
c˜B 0.04
r 0.05
Note:  0 and   are es-
timates from Bowlus and
Eckstein (2002).
E Further evidence of discrimination
The age profile of black players before and after the Bosman ruling also
presents some evidence of discrimination. Figures (9) and (10) depict the
age density of black players in the squads of “discriminating” and “non-
discriminating” teams before and after the Bosman ruling, respectively. We
consider discriminating firms as the teams whose proportions of black players
in the squad is lower than 75% of the other squads, and non-discriminating
firms as those where the proportions of black players is higher than 25%
of the other squads. Of course, this way of selecting discriminating and
non-discriminating firms is far from perfect, but it fits in with our empiri-
cal strategy and our model. In our model, firms that discriminate are more
likely to have their black players poached by rival firms. We should therefore
expect these firms to have less black players.
In Figure (9), we observe that the age densities of black players pre-
Bosman are quite similar in discriminating and non-discriminating clubs,
but there is a huge change post-Bosman (Figure 10): the age density of
black players is much more left-skewed in discriminating clubs. Why is this
interesting? If we consider that mobility was constrained before Bosman,
then we can propose the following explanation: when job-to-job mobility is
high, players that were employed in discriminating clubs want to leave as
soon as they get the chance. When players are young, they tend to play
for their local clubs or simply for any club that wants them, whether these
discriminate or not. Therefore, in discriminating clubs, the black players we
find are mostly young: older players leave as soon as they get the chance.
However, as job-to-job mobility was lower before Bosman, black players were
less likely to gain from this strategy, hence the similar age profiles between
discriminating and non-discriminating clubs.
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Figure 9: Pre-Bosman Figure 10: Post-Bosman
F First stage estimations
Table 9: Market-test: League Performance and Discrimination - 1st stage
Dependent Variable: Relative Log Wage Bill
Sample: Pre-Bosman (1981-1993) Post-Bosman (1996-2008)
Share of black English players 0.009 -0.003
(0.140) (0.140)
Number of players used 0.007c -0.002
(0.004) (0.003)
Lagged log attendances 0.248a 0.522a
(0.008) (0.098)
Lagged cup performance 0.011b 0.004
(0.005) (0.004)
Relative record transfer fee 0.125a 0.023a
(0.036) (0.004)
Observations 259 268
Club fixed eﬀects Yes Yes
F test of excluded instruments 14.83a 28.69a
Angrist-Pischke underidentification  2(3) 46.41a 83.99a
Test of overidentifying restrictions 6.50 3.85
 2(2) p-value 0.72 0.15
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered at the club level, with a, b and c denoting significance at the
1%, 5% and 10% level respectively.
47
Table 10: Market-test: Match Performance and Discrimination, long span - 1st stage
Dependent Variable: Diﬀerence in Log Wage Bill
Sample: Pre-Bosman (1981-1993) Post-Bosman (1996-2008)
Diﬀerence in share of black English players 0.035 0.116
(0.081) (0.123)
Diﬀerence in number of players used 0.009a -0.001
(0.002) (0.002)
Diﬀerence in lagged attendances 0.011a 0.009a
(0.003) (0.003)
Diﬀerence in lagged cup performance 0.009a 0.004b
(0.003) (0.002)
Relative record transfer fee 0.088a 0.271a
(0.032) (0.044)
Observations 3129 3264
Pair of clubs fixed eﬀects Yes Yes
F test of excluded instruments 11.74a 17.09a
Angrist-Pischke underidentification  2(3) 36.49a 53.46a
Test of overidentifying restrictions 0.461 3.034
 2(2) p-value 0.79 0.22
Notes: robust standard errors in parentheses are two-way clustered at the visiting and the receiving club level, with a
and b denoting significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively.
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